The following two articles are regarding the role of Cuba in crippling the apartheid regime in South Africa and subsquently helping our brother nations, Angola and Namibia, get and retain their sovereignty.

The Story of How Cuba Helped to Free Africa
Isaac Saney
Morning Star, November 4, 2005

Cuba's direct, critical and extensive role in the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa is little known in the West. November 5th, 2005 marks the 30th anniversary of Cuba's decision to deploy combat-troops, at the request of the Angolan government, to repulse a major South African invasion of October 1975. In 1987-1988, a decisive battle occurred in the south-eastern Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale. When it occurred, the battle was the largest military engagement in Africa since the North African battles of the Second World War. Arrayed on one side were the armed forces of Cuba, Angola and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO); on the other, the South African Defense Forces, military units of the Union for the Total National Independence of Angola (UNITA — the South African-supported organization) and the South African Territorial Forces of Pretoria-controlled Namibia.

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale is marginalized in Western mainstream scholarship, frequently ignored, almost as if it had never occurred. However, the overarching significance of the battle cannot be erased; it was the turning point in the struggle against apartheid. In Black Africa — particularly in southern Africa — the battle has attained legendary status. It is considered THE debacle of apartheid: a rout of the South African armed forces that altered the balance of power in the region and heralded the demise of racist rule in South Africa. Thus, the battle is often referred to as the African Stalingrad of apartheid: the decisive event that defeated Pretoria's objective of establishing regional hegemony — a strategy which was vital to defending and preserving apartheid — and directly led to the independence of Namibia and accelerated the dismantling of apartheid. Cuba's contribution was crucial as it provided the essential reinforcements, material and planning.

Cuba's involvement in Angola began in the 1960s when relations were established with the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The MPLA was the principal organization in the struggle to liberate Angola from Portuguese colonialism. In 1975, the Portuguese withdrew from Angola. However, in order to stop the MPLA from coming to power, the U.S. government had already been funding various groups, in particular the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by the notorious Jonas Savimbi.

In August 1975, South African Defence Forces (SADF), with the support of Washington, invaded Angola. This was followed by a much larger invasion in October. On November 5th, in response to a request from the Angolan government, the Cuban government initiated the deployment of combat troops in Operation Carlota, named after the leader of a revolt against slavery that took place in Cuba on November 5, 1843. It must be emphasized that all military service in Angola was on a voluntary basis. Cuban military assistance was decisive in not only stopping the South African drive to Luanda, the capital, but pushing [South Africa's troops] out of Angola. The defeat of the South African forces was a major development in the African anti-colonial struggle. The significance was underscored by The World, the foremost Black South African newspaper, which declared: "Black Africa is riding the crest of a wave generated by the Cuban success in Angola. Black Africa is tasting the heady wine of the possibility of realizing the dream of "total liberation."

Cuban involvement in Southern Africa was repeatedly dismissed as surrogate activity for the Soviet Union. In an acclaimed and award-winning book, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-76, Piero Gliejeses unequivocally demonstrates that: 1) the Cuban government — as it had repeatedly asserted — decided to dispatch combat troops to Angola only after the Angolan government had requested Cuba's military assistance to repel the South Africans, refuting Washington's assertion that South African forces intervened in Angola only after the arrival of the Cuban forces and 2) the Soviet Union had no role in Cuba's decision and were not even informed prior to deployment. In short, Cuba was not the puppet of the USSR. Even The Economist magazine, in a 2002 article, acknowledges that the Cuban government acted on its "own initiative."

In 1987, the FAPLA, the Angolan armed forces, launched an offensive against UNITA. The Cubans had advised against this operation because it would create the opportunity for a significant South African invasion, which is what transpired. The South Africans invaded, stopped and threw back the Angolan forces. The fighting became centred on the town and strategic military base of Cuito Cuanavale, which was important as a forward airbase to patrol and defend southern Angola. Pretoria committed its best troops and most sophisticated military hardware to its capture.

As the situation for the besieged Angolan troops became critical, Havana was asked by the Angolan government to intervene. On November 15th, 1987 Cuba decided to reinforce its forces by sending fresh detachments, arms and equipment, including tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft weapons and aircraft. Eventually Cuban troop strength would rise to more than 50, 000, with 40,000 deployed in the south where the major engagements were occurring. Cuba was also able to achieve air supremacy, which was a critical factor in repelling the South Africans. It must be emphasized that for a small country such as Cuba the deployment of 50,000 troops would be the equivalent of the U.S. deploying 1.25 million soldiers.

The Cuban government viewed preventing the fall of Cuito Cuanavale as imperative. A South African victory would have meant not only the capture of the town and the destruction of the best Angolan military formations, but, quite probably, the end of Angola's existence as an independent country. At Cuito Cuanavale, the SADF were dealt a decisive defeat. As the South Africans withdrew, the Cubans, together with Angolan and SWAPO forces, advanced toward the Namibian border. This advance exposed the insecurity and vulnerability of the South African troops in northern Namibia. This was further compounded by another South African debacle, when on June 27th 1988 at the south western Angolan town of Tchipa a major South African offensive was resoundingly routed when the SADF was encircled. This defeat was described in South Africa as "a crushing humiliation."

This defeat on the ground forced South Africa to the negotiating table, resulting in Namibian independence and dramatically hastening the end of apartheid. In a July 1991 speech delivered in Havana, Nelson Mandela underscored Cuba's vital role:


"The Cuban people hold a special place in the hearts of the people of Africa. The Cuban internationalists have made a contribution to African independence, freedom and justice unparalleled for its principled and selfless character. We in Africa are used to being victims of countries wanting to carve up our territory or subvert our sovereignty. It is unparalleled in African history to have another people rise to the defense of one of us. The defeat of the apartheid army was an inspiration to the struggling people in South Africa! Without the defeat of Cuito Cuanavale our organizations would not have been unbanned! The defeat of the racist army at Cuito Cuanavale has made it possible for me to be here today! Cuito Cuanavale was a milestone in the history of the struggle for southern African liberation!


Cuba's role in Angola illustrates the division between those who fight for the cause of freedom, liberation and justice, to repel invaders and colonialists, and those who fight against just causes, those who wage war to occupy, colonize and oppress.

Battle of Cuito Cuanavale revisited

Piero Gleijeses: ANALYSIS

11 July 2007 10:59

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the opening of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, in south-eastern Angola, which pitted the armed forces of apartheid South Africa against the Cuban army and Angolan forces. General Magnus Malan writes in his memoirs that this campaign marked a great victory for the South African Defence Force (SADF). But Nelson Mandela could not disagree more: Cuito Cuanavale, he asserted, “was the turning point for the liberation of our continent -- and of my people -- from the scourge of apartheid”.

Debate over the significance of Cuito Cuanavale has been intense, partly because the relevant South African documents remain classified. I have, however, been able to study files from the closed Cuban archives as well as many US documents. Despite the ideological divide that separates Havana and Washington, their records tell a remarkably similar story.

Let me review the facts briefly. In July 1987, the Angolan army (Fapla) launched a major offensive in south-eastern Angola against Jonas Savimbi’s forces. When the offensive started to succeed, the SADF, which controlled the lower reaches of south-western Angola, intervened in the south-east. By early November, the SADF had cornered elite Angolan units in Cuito Cuanavale and was poised to destroy them.

The United Nations Security Council demanded that the SADF unconditionally withdraw from Angola, but the Reagan administration ensured that this demand had no teeth. US Assistant Secretary for Africa Chester Crocker reassured Pretoria’s ambassador: “The resolution did not contain a call for comprehensive sanctions, and did not provide for any assistance to Angola. That was no accident, but a consequence of our own efforts to keep the resolution within bounds.” [1] This gave the SADF time to annihilate Fapla’s best units.

By early 1988, South African military sources and Western diplomats were confident that the fall of Cuito was imminent. This would have dealt a devastating blow to the Angolan government.

But on November 15 1987, Cuban President Fidel Castro had decided to send more troops and weapons to Angola -- his best planes with his best pilots, his most sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons and his most modern tanks. Castro’s goal was not merely to defend Cuito, it was to force the SADF out of Angola once and for all. He later described this strategy to South African Communist Party leader Joe Slovo: Cuba would halt the South African onslaught and then attack from another direction, “like a boxer who with his left hand blocks the blow and with his right -- strikes”. [2]

Cuban planes and 1 500 Cuban solders reinforced the Angolans, and Cuito did not fall.

On March 23 1988, the SADF launched its last major attack on the town. As Colonel Jan Breytenbach writes, the South African assault “was brought to a grinding and definite halt” by the combined Cuban and Angolan forces.

Now Havana’s right hand prepared to strike. Powerful Cuban columns were marching through south-western Angola toward the Namibian border. The documents telling us what the South African leaders thought about this threat are still classified. But we know what the SADF did: it gave ground. US intelligence explained that the South Africans withdrew because they were impressed by the suddenness and scale of the Cuban advance and because they believed that a major battle “involved serious risks”. [3]

As a child in Italy, I heard my father talk about the hope he and his friends had felt in December 1941, as they listened to radio reports of German troops vacating Rostov on the Don -- the first time in two years of war that the German “superman” had been forced to retreat. I remembered his words -- and the profound sense of relief they conveyed -- as I read South African and Namibian press reports from these months in early 1988.

On May 26 1988, the chief of the SADF announced that “heavily armed Cuban and Swapo [South West Africa People’s Organisation] forces, integrated for the first time, have moved south within 60km of the Namibian border”. The South African administrator general in Namibia acknowledged on June 26 that Cuban MIG-23s were flying over Namibia, a dramatic reversal from earlier times when the skies had belonged to the SADF. He added that “the presence of the Cubans had caused a flutter of anxiety” in South Africa.

Such sentiments were however not shared by black South Africans, who saw the retreat of the South African forces as a beacon of hope.

While Castro’s troops advanced toward Namibia, Cubans, Angolans, South Africans and Americans were sparring at the negotiating table. Two issues were paramount: whether South Africa would finally accept implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, which prescribed Namibia’s independence, and whether the parties could agree on a timetable for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola.

The South Africans arrived with high hopes: Foreign Minister Pik Botha expected that Resolution 435 would be modified; Defence Minister Malan and President PW Botha asserted that South Africa would withdraw from Angola only “if Russia and its proxies did the same.” They did not mention withdrawing from Namibia. On March 16 1988, Business Day reported that Pretoria was “offering to withdraw into Namibia -- not from Namibia -- in return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The implication is that South Africa has no real intention of giving up the territory any time soon.”

But the Cubans had reversed the situation on the ground, and when Pik Botha voiced the South African demands, Jorge Risquet, who headed the Cuban delegation, fell on him like a ton of bricks: “The time for your military adventures, for the acts of aggression that you have pursued with impunity, for your massacres of refugees ... is over.” South Africa, he said, was acting as though it was “a victorious army, rather than what it really is: a defeated aggressor that is withdrawing ... South Africa must face the fact that it will not obtain at the negotiating table what it could not achieve on the battlefield.”[4]

As the talks ended, Crocker cabled Secretary of State George Shultz that they had taken place “against the backdrop of increasing military tension surrounding the large build-up of heavily armed Cuban troops in south-west Angola in close proximity to the Namibian border ... The Cuban build-up in southwest Angola has created an unpredictable military dynamic.”[5]



The burning question was: Would the Cubans stop at the border? To answer this question, Crocker sought out Risquet: “Does Cuba intend to halt its troops at the border between Namibia and Angola?” Risquet replied, “If I told you that the troops will not stop, it would be a threat. If I told you that they will stop, I would be giving you a Meprobamato [a Cuban tranquilliser]. ... and I want to neither threaten nor reassure you ... What I can say is that the only way to guarantee [that our troops stop at the border] would be to reach an agreement [on Namibia’s independence].”[6]

The next day, June 27 1988, Cuban MIGs attacked SADF positions near the Calueque dam, 11km north of the Namibian border. The CIA reported that “Cuba’s successful use of air power and the apparent weakness of Pretoria’s air defences” highlighted the fact that Havana had achieved air superiority in southern Angola and northern Namibia. A few hours after the Cubans’ successful strike, the SADF destroyed a nearby bridge over the Cunene river. They did so, the CIA surmised, “to deny Cuban and Angolan ground forces easy passage to the Namibia border and to reduce the number of positions they must defend.” [7] Never had the danger of a Cuban advance into Namibia seemed more real.

The last South African soldiers left Angola on August 30, before the negotiators had even begun to discuss the timetable of the Cuban withdrawal from Angola.

Despite Washington’s best efforts to stop it, Cuba changed the course of Southern African history. Even Crocker acknowledged Cuba’s role when he cabled Shultz, on August 25 1988: “Reading the Cubans is yet another art form. They are prepared for both war and peace. We witness considerable tactical finesse and genuinely creative moves at the table. This occurs against the backdrop of Castro’s grandiose bluster and his army’s unprecedented projection of power on the ground.”[8]

The Cubans’ battlefield prowess and negotiating skills were instrumental in forcing South Africa to accept Namibia’s independence. Their successful defence of Cuito was the prelude for a campaign that forced the SADF out of Angola. This victory reverberated beyond Namibia.

Many authors -- Malan is just the most recent example -- have sought to rewrite this history, but the US and Cuban documents tell another story. It was expressed eloquently by Thenjiwe Mtintso, South Africa’s ambassador to Cuba, in December 2005: “Today South Africa has many newly found friends. Yesterday these friends referred to our leaders and our combatants as terrorists and hounded us from their countries while supporting apartheid ... These very friends today want us to denounce and isolate Cuba. Our answer is very simple: it is the blood of Cuban martyrs -- and not of these friends -- that runs deep in the African soil and nurtures the tree of freedom in our country.”